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INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
One should take caution in using "instructions" or "requests to charge" as collected from other jurisdictions which
place no limitation on the judge's power to charge a jury
as does Article 5, Section 26 of the South Carolina Constitution. They will be found collected in "Brickwood Sackett Instructions", "Branson's Instructions to Juries" and "Reed's
Branson's Instructions to Juries", the latter being Branson's

Text brought up to 1936.
Since a judge in South Carolina cannot charge on the
facts, any request to charge must not state a fact in it, directly or indirectly. If a request is so framed as to present

to the jury a certain fact or facts together with a conclusion
to be drawn in behalf of that party, the request must be
framed hypothetically. Therefore, even if there is a doubt
whether the request harbors a fact within itself, solve that
doubt by beginning the request with "IF".
For example: "If you find from the evidence that so and
so is the truth, then plaintiff would not be entitled to recover
and your verdict would be for the defendant."
Be very careful, before adopting verbatim a request or instruction from any of the three above texts, that it does not
state any fact. It is always advisable to try and find a like
South Carolina case with requests in it that have met the
Supreme Court's approval, and select one's requests therefrom.
Collins etc. Co. v. Hewlett (1917), 109 S. C. 245, 95 S. E.
510, tells one that in South Carolina the judge must charge
basic law even though not requested. Following that case
is generally considered by the Bar that in a negligence case
a judge must (1) define negligence and state what legal duty
was owed the defendant; (2) that defendant is not liable
unless his negligence was a proximate cause, defining same;

(3) that actual damages are to be awarded, if liability, defining same; (4) who has the burden of proof, defining same.
As said in the Collins case at page 253:
....
Suppose the Court had only read the pleadings, and
then directed the jury: "You will, therefore, decide either
in favor of the plaintiff or for the defendant. If you
find that the plaintiff has not made out its case by the
greater weight of the evidence, you will find for the
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defendant. If you find that the plaintiff has made out
his case by the greater weight of the evidence, you will
find for the plaintiff."
Plainly that would not have been a compliance with the

direction of the Constitution to declare the law. The law
is the right of a party arising out of a state of facts.
A jury ought to be instructed about what right springs
out of a fact to be determined by them. The jury ought
not to be left to cut a way through the woods with no
compass to guide it. It is true a Court is not bound to
charge all the law, on every phase of the case, at the risk
of a reversal for a violation of the Constitution. It has
been frequently held that a party who desires a specific
charge, one not embraced in the general charge of the
Court, ought to request it. We think the instant charge
was hardly a sufficient compliance with the Constitution.
The jury was not instructed in what the breach of a
contract consisted, and the difference between a partial
breach and an entire breach, and the legal consequences
of such breaches, and the duty the plaintiff owed to the
defendant in the event of a breach by the defendant, and
the measure of damages the plaintiff was entitled to, in
the event of recovery. ....
However, White v. Charlestonetc. 1y.Co. (1925), 132 S. C.
448, 129 S. E. 457, has cast serious doubt on the entire matter as to what is "basic". There the judge left out (3) above,
and the Supreme Court said he was under no duty as to defining actual damages since such omission could occur by
"inadvertence", and that the duty was on the attorney to
specially request such a charge. So, where does the judge's
contsitutional duty begin and end? We have no definite yardstick. The law as to that is now on a case basis, i.e., one must
know his cases on the particular subject.

State v. Brice (1930), 190 S. C. 208, 2 S. E. 2d 391, tells the
judge he must charge the law of self-defense, when that issue
is in the case, and no special request by the attorney is necessary, and yet, in a homicide case, an attorney can virtually
electrocute his client in South Carolina if he fails to request
a charge as to recommendation to mercy. State v. Adams
(1909), 68 S.C. 421, 97 S. E. 676, wherein the Court declared
at page 427:
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Failure to charge the jury that they could convict

of murder and recommend to mercy, and that such reconnendation would result in a sentence of life imprisonment instead of a sentence of death, has been held by this
Court not to be reversible error, when there was no request for such a charge. State v. Owens, 44 S. C., 324,
22 S. E., 244. The rule is thus stated in State v. Myers,
40 S. C., 556, 18 S. E., 892: "As will be observed,
in the first ground of appeal the appellant alleges that
the Circuit Judge erred in failing to make a charge that
appellant now thinks would have inured to his benefit.
By numerous decisions of this Court it has been held to
be the law in this State, that no such allegation of error
will be considered in this Court unless a request for such
charge has been made to the Circuit Judge on the trial
before him." See 11 Ency. P. & P., 217, and the numerous
authorities there cited. The author says: "The failure of
a Judge to charge upon any material point usually results from inadvertence, and the law casts upon the parties the duty of calling the Judge's attention to the matter. If he then refuses to give a proper requested instruction, such refusal is a ground of error; but a party
cannot, in a court of error, avail himself of an omission
which he made no effort to have supplied at the time.
The Court cannot be presumed to do more in ordinary
cases than express its opinion upon the questions which

the parties themselves have raised on the trial. It is
not bound to submit to the jury any particular proposition of law unless its attention is called to it. If counsel
desire to bring any view of the law of the case before
the jury, they must make such view the subject of a request to charge, and failing in this they cannot assign
error."
Any other doctrine would, we think, produce overwhelming embarrassment and delay in the practical administration of justice. Under the Constitution of 1895,
the rule has been applied in State v. Smith, 57 S. C., 489,
35 S. E., 727; State v. Chiles, 58 S. C., 47, 36 S. E., 496;
Youngblood v. R. R. Co., 60 S. C., 9, 38 S. E., 232; Sudduth v. Sumeral, 61 S. C., 276, 39 S. E., 434, and other
cases. The doctrine is based on acquiescence and waiver.
It is true, the Constitution of 1895 requires the Judges
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in charging juries "to declare the law." But the right
to have all the law declared may be waived like any other
right, and an omission acquiesced in. The failure to request instructions on any particular point is regarded
waiver of the right to such instruction and acquiescence
in the omission.
State v. McGee (1930), 185 S. C. 184, 193 S. E. 303, puts no
duty on the judge as to charging regarding the degree of
proof necessary as to the elements of self-defense. Maybe
that case can be distinguished because the judge asked the
attorney if there was anything further and got no response.
He is under no duty to charge that certain conduct is negligence per se. There again a careless or ignorant attorney
can lose his client's case by waiver. Williams v. S. A. L. Ry.
(1906), 76 S. C. 1, 56 S. E. 652.
Even the presumption of innocence, one of the strongest
known to the law, is not basic when the Court by "an oversight" fails to charge as to it. In the absence of a request
to charge there is waiver. State v. Barnett (1951), 218 S. C.
415, 63 S. E. 2d 57.
Of course, if the judge charges a principle of law which
is correct as far as it goes, but something could have been
added, it is the attorney's duty to request the addition, else
there is waiver. Harrelson v. Reeves (1951), 219 S. C. 394,
65 S. E. 2d 278. As said in Nichols v. CongareeFertilizer Co.
(1929), 151 S. C. 417, 149 S. E. 162, at page 420:
.... The Court made a general and comprehensive charge
of the law applicable to the issues made by the pleadings

and the evidence; and what he said with respect to
contributory negligence and assumption of risk could not
possibly have misled or confused the jury. In fact, the
charge on these questions was unusually clear. If counsel for the defendant thought it was too general, he should
have requested more specific instructions. [Cases cited]
Only law that is applicable to the issues in the case should
be charged. State v. Rivers (1938), 186 S. C. 221, 196 S. E.
6. This also should make a trial attorney cautious in preparing
his requests to charge. As the Court pointed out on page 224
of the Rivers case:
In charging a jury, the Circuit Judge should be cautious to charge only the law which is applicable to the
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case as made by the facts, for under some circumstances
a mass of inapplicable law burdened upon the juror's
mind may lead to great confusion. It is the constitutional
duty of the Circuit Judge to declare the law, but this duty
as heretofore stated only requires a statement of the
law which is required by the facts adduced by the testimony. However, even though there was no testimony
concerning the commission of a felony, we do not feel
that this utterance on the part of the Circuit Judge in
his charge constitutes reversible error. The jury could
not have been misled by the reading of the above section
of the Code when they were clearly and unequivocally
instructed that the section read to them was not applicable to the facts of the case presented for their determina-

tion and conclusion, inasmuch as no felony or larceny had
been disclosed by the testimony. This exception is overruled.
See Munn v. Asseff (1954), 226 S. C. 54, 83 S. E. 2d 642,
especially page 59.
Judge's Duty in Charging Jury: See Powers v.- Rawls
(1922), 119 S. C. 134, 112 S. E. 78.
Judge's Duty in Ruling in Evidence: State v. Turner
(1921), 117 S. C. 470, 109 S. E. 119.
Attorney's Duty at Time of Argument: State v. Singletary
(1938), 187 S. C. 19, 26, 196 S. E. 527.
The custom now is to present requests to county and circuit
judges as soon as the trial begins, usually after the pleadings
are read. It was started, the writer understands, by Circuit
Judge Griffith, and it is very practical and helpful to a trial
judge and gives him plenty of time to check the requests.
When Jury is Judge of the Law: In South Carolina under
Article I, Sec. 21 of the Constitution, the jury is the judge
of the law as well as the facts in criminal libel cases only,
and not in criminal slander cases. But, under the rule in
State v. Syphrett (1887), 27 S. C. 29, 2 S. E. 624, even tho
the jury is the judge of what the law is, the judge must
charge them the law as it exists in South Carolina, whether
they apply it or not, and, if the judge charges them the wrong
law, a new trial will be granted. So in such cases also the
necessary requests to charge should be prepared and handed
to the judge. The Court said at page 30:
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Judge Kershaw, in his charge to the jury, while fully
recognizing the right of the jury, under an indictment
for libel, to be the judges of the law as well as the facts,
said that he did not think that this relieved him from
the duty of giving to the jury his views of the law of
libel. ....

Again at page 34 it was declared:
From this it follows that it is not only the right, but the
duty, of the presiding judge, upon the trial of hidictments
for libel, to declare to the jury the law applicable thereto,
and if he errs in so doing, such errors may be reviewed
on appeal, just as in any other case, unless the defendant
is acquitted, when, under a well settled principle of the

common law, now incorporated in our constitution, "no
person, after having once been acquitted by a jury, shall
again for the same offence be put in jeopardy of his life
or liberty." Constitution,article I., section 18.
Judge Must Charge as to Issues Made by the Evidence: In this
state the judge must charge the law applicable to the issues as
they exist when all the evidence is in, even tho by neglect,
ignorance or by consent of an attorney, the evidence that has
come in without objection has changed the issues from those
raised by the pleadings and may have changed the entire cause
of action. Taylor v. Winnsboro Mills (1927), 146 S. 0. 28,
143 S. E. 474. The Court said at page 36:
"There may be a recovery upon evidence tending to
show that an injury was caused by the negligence alleged
in the complaint operating as a proximate cause in conjunction with another independent proximate cause not
alleged." [Cases cited]
In this case we think the issue of proximate cause was
properly left for the jury to decide. Of necessity the
practice requires that the items of negligence relied on
for recovery must be alleged in the complaint, and, if objection be made, no other act of negligence can be shown
by the testimony; but, if the testimony does tend to establish other acts of negligence, and no objection be made
thereto, the jury may consider the other acts of negli-

gence, though, if objection is made thereto, the plaintiff
should move to amend his complaint by inserting them
without actually serving a new complaint, and this mo-
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tion is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial

Judge, and, if he allows the amendment, then the testimony may be admitted; if he disallows the amendment,
the testimony will be excluded.
In this case there was testimony tending to show that
the defendant had promulgated an oral rule, but that it
was customary for the servants to disregard the rule.
This item of negligence was not alleged in the complaint,
but it is in the record without objection, and was before
the jury, and the jury had the right to consider it. ....
It should be noted that if new or different issues are allowed to come into a case, to that extent changing the cause
as pled, the attorneys should see to it that the pleadings are at
once amended so that the case as finally tried will so show up
as a matter of record in the clerk's office, since evidence
never becomes a matter of record. Unless this is done, one's
client may win on the case as finally tried and the other side
may sue again on that cause or issue as was made by the
evidence, and when the record is brought up from the clerk's
office, it will not show any res adjudicata because that record
would show that an entirely different cause was tried, or that
an entirely different issue was tried, and hence one's client
would be open to fighting again a suit he had already wvx
because his attorney failed to move to have the pleading
amended to correspond to the evidence.
BURDEN OF PROOF:
See the writer's article on "Variations in Burden of Proof'
in S. C. Law Quarterly, Vol. 1 of 1949.
The charge that the writer adopted when county judge as
to burden of proof was as follows:
By preponderance the law means not necessarily by the
greater number of witnesses or the greater quantity of the

evidence, but by the greater truth, i.e., by that evidence in
which the jury has not necessarily the greatest faith, but
the greater faith.
He has heard circuit judges express it in about the same
language.
Waiver as to Misstatement of Issues: If in South Carolina a
judge misstates an issue to the jury, the attorney should at
once call his attention to it, otherwise his client will have
waived the error. Hancock v. Junior Order, etc. (1936), 180
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S. C. 518, 186 S. E. 538, and Richardson v. Gen. Motors etc.
Corp. (1952), 221 S.C. 15, 68 S. E. 2d 874.
Jury to be Absent, When: Act No. 27 of 1953, page 28, now
set forth in the Supplement to Code as Sec. 10-1210, added a
new judicial step in that it provides that, after the charge,
"the Court shall temporarily excuse the jury" so that objections to the charge or additional requests may be made "out
of the presence of the jury".
This Act like Sec. 38-202 of the Code is evidently mandatory, however it should be noted that none of the cases applying the Act have as yet held that, if the judge does not excuse
the jury of his own accord, the attorney would waive his client's right in that regard, if he did not request that the jury
be excused. Munn v. Assef (1954), 226 S. C. 54, 83 S.E. 2d
642; Richardsonv. Register (1955), 227 S.C. 81.
MagistratesMust Charge Basic Law: Does the Constitutional
provision apply to a magistrate, even if he has no legal education? Undoubtedly, yes. Marshbank v. Marshbank (1900),
58 S. C. 92, 36 S. E. 438, holds that all magistrates are
"judges" and must charge the basic law; if any cannot do
so, the court said he should not hold office. This really
places a special responsibility on an attorney to have requests
prepared on the basic law and to present them to the magistrate as soon as the trial starts, because nearly all magistrates
are laymen.
Positive and Negative Evidence: At this point it may be
well to call attention to positive and negative evidence since
when they appear together in a case the jury should be
charged regarding their respective legal values. The rule in
South Carolina as to whether positive would legally outweigh
negative evidence used to be rather tenuous. Littlefield v.
Clarke (1811), 4 Desaus. 165. There preference was given
to positive, but seemingly only where the credibility of the
witnesses had not been attacked. Callison vs. Ry. (1916), 106
S. C. 123, 90 S. E. 260 no longer gives any legal preference.
It now turns on the weight to be given the two kinds of evidence and on the credibility of witnesses, both of which are
for the jury. Davis v. Payne, D. G. (1922), 120 S. C. 473,
113 S. E. 325, doesn't change the Callison case rule, since in
the Davis case the negative evidence was no good as a matter
of law because of the existing noise making the hearing of
any sound signals reasonably improbable.
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Although a jury in South Carolina must apply the law that
comes from the judge in order to reach a proper verdict, it
is a peculiar coincidence that their oath doesn't cover that,
but they swear only to render a "true verdict" "according to

the evidence".

Earle's Forms numbers 179, 425 and 438.

Hence, it is well to have a request to charge that they must
apply only the law charged them by the court, except, of
course, in criminal libel cases, where they are judges of the
law under the constitution.
Are Written Requests Necessary for FurtherInstructions?
The answer is, No. As stated in Goodwin v. Harrison (1957),
231 S. C. 243, 98 S. E. 2d 255, at page 248:
A further contention of appellants is that the request
for the instruction was not presented in writing as required by Circuit Court Rule 11. In the first place,
that was not the reason of the refusal of it by the court
which stated that it was uncertain whether that issue
was in the case, and it was added by the court that
instruction would not be given with reference to it,
quoting from the record, "one way or the other." Secondly, Code Section 10-1210 [See 1955 Supplement to
Code] does not contemplate written requests for further
or other instructions. It provides that after the court
has delivered to the jury a charge on the law, the jury
shall be temporarily excused to give counsel an opportunity, quoting from the statute, "to express objections
to the charge or request the charge of additional propositions * * *." See the several decisions which have construed and applied the statute and are cited in the foot-

notes to it in the code supplement.
Use of West's Digest: At this point attention is called to
the fact that hereafter West's S. C. Digest, which should
always be thoroughly checked, will not be referred to by
sections but only by volume and beginning page of the subject. It will be just as easy for the reader to turn to the index
of the subject in the Digest and find the phase he desires
to check. So, reference is now made to Volume 18 of that
Digest, beginning at page 1.
Quotient Verdicts: Bunton v. State Highway Depart.
(1937), 186 S. C. 463, 196 S. E. 188, at page 476 calls attention to the rule that a judge can refuse to charge a request
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regarding a quotient verdict as it may "suggest evil to the
jury." The Court followed the law of other jurisdictions
when it declared on page 477:

Upon consideration, we hold, in line with the rule
stated in other jurisdictions, that a quotient verdict is
illegal, and that where it is clearly shown that the verdict rendered is such a one, it should not be allowed
to stand. We see no good reason, however, to require
the trial Judge to charge the jury with regard thereto;
but we hold that, in the exercise of a wise judgment,
he may properly do so, it being a matter entirely in his
discretion. ....

When Instruction Coercive: Harper v. Abercrombie
(1920), 115 S. C. 360, 105 S. E. 749, tells one how far the

judge may go, without being reversed, while Fairey v.
Haynes (1916), 107 S. C. 115, 91 S. E. 976, points out when
he has gone too far, such as telling the jury: "I would dislike to send such a good-looking body of men to jail ......
Delivery of Verdict: A verdict is published when it is read
in the courtroom in the presence of the jury. Prior to that,
no one in the courtroom except the jury would know what
the verdict was.
In Lorick and Lowrance v. Walker (1929), 153 S. C. 309,
150 S. E. 789, where a jury, as instructed, left a sealed verdict with the bailiff, the writer ruled that he had no power
to have the jury reform the verdict. But the ruling was
reversed because they never had been discharged and should
have been instructed and sent back to the jury room. As
said at page 314:

...
. Even when a sealed verdict is permitted to be
returned, and the jury has been allowed to disperse and
separate from the time of their announcement of agree-

ment to the time of the publication of the verdict, when
it appears that the verdict is clearly erroneous as to
form, the judge has the power to require a reconsideration by the jury. [Cases Cited]
If the judge thought there was an error in the form
of the verdict, either in the misuse of the word "defendant" for that of "plaintiff," or as to the amount
of the finding for the defendant, he had the right to
inquire thereabout, in the proper manner, or by polling
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the jury, and, upon ascertainment that there was an
error, he could have directed a proper correction, either
by sending the jury back to their room to write a correct verdict or by having the correction made in open
Court with the jury's consent. ....
Here is another instance that clearly shows a trial attorney should be present when a verdict is to be published.
Also, if an attorney is present, he can exercise the right of
polling the jury, which is a substantial right of his client's
though apparently in South Carolina one discretionary with
the judge. It can be exercised at any time between publication of the verdict and discharge of the jury.
In State v. Prince (1937),

185 S. C. 150, 193 S. E. 429,

at page 156 one finds the application of the South Carolina
rule as follows:
The presiding Judge held that a sufficient agreement
had been shown, and received the verdict. Upon appeal
being taken to this Court it was held that there was a
single and simple matter to be determined, whether at
the moment of the publication the verdict represented
the juror's conclusion, which required nothing more than
his statement, unless there should be made to appear
some fact which would discredit him. The Court quoted
with approval the following statement in 16 C. J., 1098:
"Polling the jury is a practice whereby the jurors are
asked individually whether they assented and still assent
to the verdict. * * * The jury may be polled after the
verdict is given and before it is filed; and a motion or
request to poll should be made as soon as the verdict is
announced."
It is quite obvious that it would be an idle ceremony
to poll the jury if the dissent of a juror to the verdict
when it is published is to be disregarded; his previous
assent, until such polling is accomplished, is in all instances presumed. [Cases Cited.]
Durst v. So. By. at al., (1931), 161 S. C. 498, 159 S. E.
844, gives us a rule in South Carolina that seems to be more
liberal in construing a verdict than some of the cases in
other jurisdictions, in that the Durst case says at page 506
not only the language of the verdict but "other things occurring in the trial", including the charge and forms of
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verdicts given the jury may be "regarded" in construing the
verdict. One wonders if the court meant to include the evidence also as one of the "other things" to be considered.
An earlier decision, Manson v. Dempsey (1910), 88 S. C.
193, 70 S. E. 610, would leave no doubt, for there the meaning of the verdict was allowed to be explained by reference
to the evidence.
Special Verdicts: Sections 10-1452 to 10-1455, with their
annotations should be carefully read relative to this topic.
Technically a "special verdict" is one where the jury finds
all the facts - operative facts or principal facts - as alleged
in the pleading, and the judge applies the law and reaches
a conclusion. In South Carolina we have confusion although

section 10-1452 defines "special verdict", as where the jury
"finds the facts only leaving the judgment to the court'.
Armitage, Admix. v. Ry. (1932), 166 S. C. 21, 164 S. E. 169,
tells us it is a special verdict though but one issue, or
pleaded fact, was found by the jury. In reality, it was a
"special finding of fact", namely, whether Mrs. Armitage
was the statutory beneficiary. A general verdict was also
rendered for the defendant.
Even in Sec. 10-1453 the legislature used confusing language. First, it speaks of a "special verdict" upon "any or
all of the issues", then, that the jury, if they render a general
verdict, may be instructed to "find particular questions of
fact with a written finding thereon". Thus, we find that
in South Carolina a special verdict can be nothing more
than a finding of a fact or facts. And Section 10-1454 provides that "when a special finding of facts shall be inconsistent with a general verdict the former shall control the
latter."
It should also be noted that Section 10-1453 says "in every
action for the recovery of money only or specific real property the jury in their discretion may render a general or
special verdict."
Of course, a jury being laymen wouldn't know they had
the power or how to use it. So they never act of their own
accord, and even if a judge instructed them in such cases
to find a special verdict and defined it, they wouldn't have
to do so under a strict interpretation of the above language.
What definite interpretation the Supreme Court has given
the section it is difficult to say. In Manson. v. Dempsey,
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supra the decision let the general language of the section,
namely,that "in all cases" the court "may instruct the jury,
if they render a general verdict, to find upon particular
questions of fact", override the specific language, but the
ruling was pure dictum, as the case was not to recover speci-

fic real property.
In Palmetto Fertilizer Co. v. Columbia N. & L. R. Co.,
(1910), 99 S. C. 187, 83 S. E. 36, which was for the recovery
of money only, the above dictum rule on this point seems to
have been applied. However, in the later decision of Floyd
v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., (1918), 110 S. C. 384, 96 S. E. 912, a
case also for "recovery of money only", the court held that
whether a special verdict or finding of fact should be rendered was solely in the discretion of the jury, thus giving
the specific language of the section right of way over the
general, which is the usual rule of construction. The opinion
in the Floyd case declares at page 390:
The Court was not bound to direct the jury to find a
special verdict upon any or all of the issues. The statute
directs that the Court may make such direction. Section
321, Code. In the cases relied upon by the appellant the
Court had so directed, and we only held that the jury
was bound to follow the direction. Fertilizer Co. v. Railroad, 99 S. C. 197, 83 S. E. 36. More than this, the instant action is for the recovery of money only, and in
such a case the rendition of a special verdict is in the
discretion of the jury. Code, sec. 321.
Care should be taken as itisthe duty of the attorney, not
the judge, to see to it that a special verdict or finding of
fact isrendered.. Castles v. South Carolina Law and Collection Agency, (1915), 104 S. C. 81, 88 S. E. 273. Also, that
the attorney should hand it to the judge, who in turn will
see that it goes to the jury.
Since one never knows what facts a jury has found or

whether they applied the law as charged then when a general
verdict is rendered, it is sometimes wise in civil cases to
have them find particular facts along with a general verdict.
The writer, as head of the trial department of the Federal
Land Bank in Columbia from 1933-1935 ascertained that
in North Carolina a general verdict was seldom rendered.
In the everyday trial of cases, the jury brought in only
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special verdicts or findings of facts; the judge then applied
the law and came to a conclusion. It appeared to the writer,
and this was confirmed by a number of North Carolina
attorneys, that greater justice was done in the long run by
this method, and that it was a wholesome check on the jury
phase of a trial.

Special Interrogatories: South Carolina has no statute
with reference to submitting interrogatories to a jury as
to issues of facts. The nearest thing to that is "finding upon
particular questions of fact", as provided in Sec. 10-1453,
above discussed.
One wonders about the rule in Indiana as stated in Evansville etc. Co. v. Spiegel, (1911), 49 Ind. App. 412, 94 N. E.
718, that, in order to reconcile the interrogatories with a
general verdict, evidence which might have been introduced
(but wasn't) would be treated as though introduced and acted
on by the jury. Such a rule seems too far-fetched for attaining
justice or else jurors in Indiana can be given credit for farreaching imaginations.
Impeaching The Verdict: In South Carolina, while not
technically impeaching a verdict, the result of the trial
judge's viewing the premises of an occurrence without the
knowledge and consent of the attorneys is indirectly the
same in effect in that it results in a new trial. Ralph v. So.
Ry. (1931), 160 S. C. 229, 158 S. E. 409.
Should a jury take a like view there would be no doubt of
their verdict being impeached, but as to how their conduct
would be proved, whether by their affidavits or testimony
in court, or by affidavits or testimony of those who saw
them viewing the premises or else heard them say they took
such view, is a matter of "much refinement and qualification
by different courts."
The more modern rule, as applied in several other jurisdictions seems to be gaining ground, namely, that matters
"resting in the personal consciousness of one juror" and thus
inhering in his conclusion or verdict cannot be explored at
all, while his overt acts such as are "open to the knowledge
of all the jury" can be fully gone into. Two interesting decisions which go rather thoroughly into the question are
Phillips v. Rhode Island Co. (1910), 32 R. I. 16, 78 Atl. 342
and Mattox v. U. S. (1892), 146 U. S. 140, 13 Sup. Ct. 50.
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